Netwar, Bin Laden, and Al Quaeda

Berglund Authority Level 3


by Jeffrey Barlow <barlowj@pacificu.edu>
Editor, The Journal of Education, Community and Values: Interface on the Internet.
The Electronic Journal of the Berglund Center for Internet Studies

INDEX:

.01. Introduction
.02. Netwar
.03. Learning Netwar
.04. Conclusion
.05. Appendix: How to Defeat Netwar?
.06. Notes
.07. Bibliography
.08. Resources
.09. Addendum of December 14, 2001.


.01. Introduction: (Return to Index)

This editorial builds upon several on related topics published in Interface.1 Here we conclude with a discussion of the concept of "Netwar" within the specific context of the events of September 11, 2001. We have argued that these events can be best understood if we see them in their relationship to the Internet and to computer-mediated communication. There is ample evidence that both Al Quaeda and bin Laden have worked with individuals and with groups that have shown a marked ability to use these tools. We believe that the events of September are not the first example of Netwar, but they are the event that will define the concept.


.02. Netwar (Return to Index)

The concept "Netwar" has been developed by Rand Corporation researchers David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla. Perhaps the clearest use of this term, imbedded in the examination of a specific instance of it, is found in Ronfeldt and Arquilla's work, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico. Here the two define Netwar as:

... an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command. 2

We believe that the attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon can been seen as a case of Netwar. Netwar is both facilitated by the Internet as a mode of communication, and in a sense caused by the Internet as war invariably reflects both culture and underlying social and political organization. Hence, "netwar." 


.03. Learning Netwar (Return to Index)

We believe that the learning of Netwar and the development of its capabilities is a natural outgrowth of familiarity with the World Wide Web and the Internet. Just as the development of railroads suggested rapid massive troop movements by rail and the development of the tank and tactical aircraft the Blitzkrieg attack, so has the development of the Internet suggested and facilitated Netwar.
 
Moreover, there have been sufficient examples of such conflicts, such as that in Chiapis referenced above, to permit terrorists to adapt an existing model to their own needs. We believe that a coalition of terrorist groups has done so, by building on lessons learned in Mexico, and in cyberconflicts in the Mideast, and turning hitherto non-violent tactics to far more aggressive and violent ends. Contemporary conflicts already had involved substantial elements that can be seen as an impact of the Internet. In addition, the availability of information as to flight schedules, airplane characteristics, even the advertisements of flight training schools on the Web made it possible for the perpetrators of the 9-11 atrocity to make flying bombs of civilian aircraft.
 
It is, of course, too early to fully understand the precise nature of the 9-11 attacks and of the perpetrators. But we think that the evidence suggests, when viewed through the lens of Netwar, that the conspirators represent a number of organizations, often bound together by a common ideology---Wahhabist Islam.3 Wahhabism is a fiercely radical and exclusionary form of Islam. Muslims, of course, represent many different religious groups and national cultures and use the World Wide Web in a variety of ways.4 In addition to Wahhabism, the extremists, such as bin Laden, have a number of unifying elements, particularly a shared history of fighting Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and for many, perhaps in Somalia against American forces as well. Few ties are closer than those that unite warriors who have risked death together.5
 
We believe that these terrorists exist in cells ("nodes") widely distributed around the world.6 Following the usages of Netwar, they plot at points at great distance from their targets, though supported by local cells at the target site. They quickly assemble at the target ("swarm" in the parlance of Netwar) for operations, and as quickly disperse.
 
Bin Laden may be critical in that he has helped fund many such groups. He may be inspirational in that he is their most famous leader (though killing him will in no way reduce that appeal) and Al Quaeda may be the centralized organizational structure that the war in Afghanistan presupposes. (Addendum of December 14, 2001) But none of these factors is inherent to the continued survival of the network itself. There will be other wars and other opportunities to create the bonds of military camaraderie, and other areas where terrorists may train. At least one of bin Laden's supposed supporters, Ali Mohamed, a participant in the bombing of the American embassy in Kenya, let us remember, trained in the U.S. army.7

 
.04. Conclusion: (Return to Index)

The very nature of warfare has changed as a result of the Internet. Non-state players have been afforded new opportunities, have created new organizational forms suggested and facilitated by the Internet itself, and have been able to use the Internet to prepare and to stage their attacks. As historians, we can judge these issues from evidence such as that presented above. But, in trying to understand the implications for our society and for the future, we have no special powers. But we think that some elements of the problem are worth speculating upon.
 
Generals, it is said, always prepare to fight the last war. One might argue that this is precisely what the war in Afghanistan is, a form of warfare that owes far more to "Desert Storm" than to true Netwar. The war in Afghanistan does serve the purpose of making us feel confident that the problem is being solved, and it satisfies our desires to punish "evil-doers." But the essence of Netwar is that command structures are non-hierarchical and distributed. The enemy is not a country, nor a military command that can easily be "decapitated" in the classic military sense, but a network. Its model, and to a degree its inspiration, is the World Wide Web. Such a web does not have a command center but a network of nodes, which are, like the Internet itself, self-healing. Damaged nodes (like Afghanistan, Al Quaeda, or bin Laden himself) will simply be bypassed.
 
We think it probable that Al Quaeda is simply one node in an extensive network, perhaps not even one network but one in a series of cooperative but independent networks, and that bin Laden too is but one node among many. Al Quaeda and bin Laden may each be extremely important nodes, and it is possible that a devastating attack will have the desired result in that the destruction of the two will bring down the network for a time. But even if successful, to attack them through conventional means such as an attack on the Afghani state amounts, in Emory Lovins' apt phrase, to "cutting butter with a chain saw." It is inefficient and inappropriate, not to mention extremely messy. And of course, in Afghanistan the spatter is not butter but blood.
 
In addition, the massive response against Afghanistan fails a classic test of a "just" war: proportionality.8 The damage done to innocent people in Afghanistan, the destruction of what remains of the Afghani state and society, is disproportional to the wrong that they have done us---not one Afghani was directly involved in the attacks of September 11. The test of proportionality is not merely an idealistic notion, but also refers to the costs of given actions to the initiator. A disproportionate war will often have a cost disproportionate to the "good" to be achieved. For example, among the collateral damages of this war, it seems, are many elements of American civil liberties that have been taken for granted.
 
It is not surprising, however, that supporters of the war in Afghanistan continually insist that we are at "war," meaning engaged in a struggle that can be understand in terms of previous wars. This insistence is further supported rhetorically by repeated references to questionable precedents such as Pearl Harbor.9 The attack on Afghanistan and the accompanying costs to the American social and political system can be justified only by insisting that this struggle is largely a conventional "war".
 
But the terrorists cannot, we believe, be stopped by conventional warfare. To the contrary, conventional warfare will, in the long run, feed the machinery of terrorism with the energy and personnel it requires to expand. More critically, this response is not only inappropriate but ultimately will be ineffective. It will not protect us in the future, nor would it, if mounted much earlier, have prevented the outrage of September 11. This is, we believe, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger, "the wrong type of war for this time and place."
 

.05.Appendix: How To Defeat Netwar?


.06. Notes (Return to Index)
 Please note: Ordinals below are anchors back to notes.

1) See "Netwar" at: http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2001/10/editorial10.php; "Netwar and Cyberwar" at: http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2001/11/editorial11.php

2)    Examples of Netwar include the Zapatista struggle, and, we think, the Tiananmen Incident. See Fenghua Wang, "Subscribing to Democracy through the Internet: The Journal of the Association for History and Computing, Vol II, No. 3. http://mcel.pacificu.edu/jahc/jahcII3/ARTICLESII3/wang/wang.html In addition, the World Trade Organization protests in Seattle were also a sort of low-level Netwar. (See de Armond, "Netwar in the Emerald City.") We believe that the activities of the Earth Liberation Front can also be seen as an example of Netwar. As we accumulate more examples of Netwar, the concept itself must change to accommodate them. Both the Chiapas example, and that of the WTO protests seem to suggest that Netwars will be characterized by some minimal level of violence. But the events of September 11 show that Netwars can be horrifyingly violent.
 
3)   See http://lexicorient.com/cgi-bin/eo-direct-frame.pl?http://i-cias.com
 /e.o/wahhabis.htm
 
4) "Islam, Technology and Community: September 11th and Its Global Meaning." By Deborah Wheeler. The Journal of Education, Community, and Values: Interface on the Internet. Vol I, no. 10. http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2001/10/wheeler.php
 
5)   See the interviews with family survivors and comrades-in-arms of men killed in Vietnam at "Don't Let 'Em Fade..." http://mcel.pacificu.edu/mcel/dlef/index.html.
 
6)   The administration has said that such cells or nodes exist in 60 countries. Karen Young, ""Sleeper Cells" of el Quaeda are next Target." Washington Post, December 3, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46909-2001Dec2.html Accessed December 3, 2001.
 
7)   "Former Army sergeant pleads guilty to embassy bombing-related charges" October 20, 2000 ) CNN.COM.Law Center.
http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/10/20/embassy.bombings.01/
 
8)  See The "Jus Ad Bellem Convention" at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm > Accessed December 2, 2001

9) For a very interesting treatment of the use of analogical reasoning in history see David J. Staley, "Digital History: Analogies." in The Journal of the Assocation for History and Computing, IV, 3, November, 2001. <http://mcel.pacificu.edu/jahc/jahciv3/p-resources/staley.html> Accessed December 13, 2001.

.05.Appendix: How To Defeat Netwar? (Return to Index)

I have been pressed by several readers of drafts of this piece to state more positively my own solutions to the problems of combatting Netwar. I do so with great reluctance as this takes me out of the historian's zone of comfort (the past) and into the pit of the political scientist, policy discussions. But perhaps an analysis such as the foregoing demands less than the usual academic distance. I place this analysis in an appendix to indicate its ancillary nature.

However, it does seem to me that the solutions, once Netwar is understood, are at once obvious and extremely difficult. They will require a very fine and controlled hand which, frankly, I see as lacking in U.S. policy to this point. The first point is to break the network, particularly the communication between nodes. Whether this is seen as one net called "Al Quaeda" or as a variety of intertwined nets, they must be broken before the operations of the nodes can be curtailed. The classic means of breaking such clandestine units is widespread counter-terror: mass arrests, violent interrogations, pursuit of even the marginally or questionably guilty, secret trials, the suppression of doubters and naysayers. This was the method used both by the Nationalist Party in China to break the Communists in the 1930's, and by the Diem regime in Vietnam to break the Viet Minh-Viet Cong in the 1950's. Both these operations were successful in the short run and brought the two regimes a measure of breathing space. Ultimately, however, these methods were counter-productive. They eventually drove even the innocent and the loyal opposition into the hands of those best able to protect them from governmental terror, the conspiratorial groups themselves. The terrorists, then, underwent a severe period of testing, but in doing so broadened their appeal and refined their methods. The governments in turn alienated potential supporters. There is a lesson in these two experiences for us. Excessive force breeds a fatal counter-reaction.

Rather, the force used must be, like "war" itself, proportionate. Only the truly guilty should be pursued, and they must be treated fairly and openly, however unlikely they are to treat us the same. This means securing adequate information, requiring a major restructuring of our means of gathering intelligence. These measures will necessarily be costly and slow to produce results. They will require patience and fortitude, particularly the fortitude to avoid short-term but emotionally satisfying responses. They will also require that there be no hint of partisanship in policy. This will mean returning U.S. foreign and intelligence policies to the status they once enjoyed as bipartisan political functions.

Conflating the culture wars, the domestic interests of either conservatives or liberals, internationalists or religious fundamentalists, will produce partisan bickering that forces bad policy choices by political actors with one eye on the electorate and one on the enemy.

Good policy will also require a close scrutiny of the advantages and the short-comings of the Internet. We ultimately will have to weigh the security offered by a more controlled cyberspace vs. the value of a truly global civic culture. This will be the subject of our next editorial: "Security vs. Civic Culture."

.07. BIBLIOGRAPHY (Return to Index)

 Note: This bibliography is cumulative for the entire series of editorials.
 
Americo, R.P.C. "Cyberwar: The mouse is Mightier than the Missile," QSDG Magazine <http://www.qsdg.com/phpelements/retrievearticles.php?article_ID=12444 > Accessed 10/30/2001
 
Armond, Paul de. "Netwar in the Emerald City. WTO protest strategy and tactics. < http://nwcitizen.com/publicgood/reports/wto/ >Accessed 9/25/01.
 
Armond, Paul de. "What is Netwar?" <http://www.au/af.mil/au/2025/volume3/chap03/v3C3-2.htm> Accessed 9/25/2001
 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. "Fighting the Network War." Wired, December, 2001. p, 142-151.
 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. In Athena's Camp. Rand, Santa Monica: 1997.
 
Bickers, Charles. "Cyberwar: Combat on the Web" The Far Eastern Economic Review, <http://www.feer.com/2001/0108_16/p030innov.html> Accessed 10/30/2001
 
Bonner, Raymond. "British Accuse Algerian of Role in Attacks." The New York Times on the Web, 9/30/2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/national/30INQU.html>
 
Brewis, Bob. "Kosovo Ushered in Cyberwar," FWC.com <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/1999/fcw_092799_newscyber.asp > Accessed 10/30/2001
 
Brogan, Patrick. The Fighting Never Stopped. Vintage Books, New York: 1990.
 
Bumiller,. Elisabeth. " A Warning," The New York Times, November 27, 2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/27/international/27PREX.html?
 searchpv=nytToday > Accessed November 27, 2001.
 
Campen, Alan D. and Douglas H. Dearth, Contributing Editors, Cyberwar 2.0 : Myths, Mysteries and Reality. Fairfax, Virginia: AFCEA International Press, 1998.
 
Cleaver, Harry. "Computer-Linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism." <http://www.antenna.nl/~waterman/cleaver2.html> Accessed 9/25/2001
 
Cleaver, Harry. "The Space of Cyberspace: Body Politics, Frontiers and Enclosures." <http://www.echonyc.com/~women/Issue17/rev-cleaver.html>Accessed 10/02/2001
 
Cleaver, Harry. "The Virtual and Real Chiapas Support Network: A Review and Critique of Judith Adler Hellman's "Real and Viirtual Chiapas: Magical Realism and the Left," Socialist Register, 2000." <http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/cleaver/anti-hellman.html >Accessed 9/25/2001
 
"Cyberwar with China: Self-fulfilling Prophecy"http://www.attrition.org. <http://www.attrition.org/security/commentary/cn-us-war.html > Accessed 10/30/2001
 
"February 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City" Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,< http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/wtc93.htm.>
 
Freeh, Louis J. "Threats to U.S. National Security" Statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington D.C., January 28, 1998. Infowar.com. <http://www.infowar.com/civil_de/civil_022798b.html-ssi>Accessed 10/31/2001
 
Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan's Endless War. State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
 
Hartocollis, Anemonia. "Campus Culture Wars Flare Anew." The New York Times on the Web, 9/30.01, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/02/college/storyofweek.html>
 
Ignatiev, Michael. Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Picador Press, 2001.
 
Kalman, Matthew. "Middle East conflict spills into cyberspace." USA Today. <http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti723.htm >
 
Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God. With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
 
Ludlow, Peter. Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
 
McGirk, Tim. "Wired for Warfare," Time.com <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,32558.00.html > Accessed 10/30/2001
 
Mackay, Neil. "The British Breeding Ground," The Sunday Herald, (Glasgow) September 30, 2001. < http://www.Sundayherald.com/18874> Accessed 10/31/2001.
 
Moseley, Alex. "Just War Theory" The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm > Accessed December 3, 2001
 
 Piller, Charles and David Wilson. "The Terrorists are Winning the Cyber War." latimes.com <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-091901
techspy.story> Accessed 10/23/2001.
 
Rasjid, Ahmed. Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
 
Rathmell, Andrew. "Netwar in the Gulf." <http://www.infowar.com/class_3/class3_q.html-ssi>Accessed 9/25/2001.
 
Ronfeldt, David, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller, and Melissa Fuller. The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico., Rand, Santa Monica: 1998.
 
Ronfeldt, David, and John Arquilla. "Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future." First Monday, <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html> Accessed October 5, 2001.
 
Simon, Joel. "Rand Researcher Decries Political Networking." Pacific News Service, News Analysis. 20 March, 1995. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27/008.html >Accessed 9/25/2001
 
"Spain Arrests Six from Algeria" The New York Times on the Web. 9/27/2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/international/27SPAI.html >Accessed 9/30/2001
 
Stein, George J. "Information Attack: Information Warfare in 2025. A Research paper presented to the Air Force 2025." <http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume3/V3C-1.html >Accessed 9/25/2001
 
Stein, George J. "Information War---Cyberwar---Netwar." Infowar.com <http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/stein1.html-ssi> Accessed 9/25/2001.
 
Sullivan, Bob. "Cyberwar: the threat of chaos." MSNBC <http://www.msnbc.com/news/
 295227.asp?cp1=1#body > Accessed 10/30/2001
 
"U.S. Makes Cyberwar on Bin Laden" NewsMax.Com <http://www.newsmax.com >
 
Verton, Daniel. "New Cyberterror Threatens AF." <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/1999/
 FCW_050399_431.asp >Accessed 9/25/01
 
Wang, Fenghua. "Subscribing to Democracy through the Internet,: The Journal of the Association for History and Computing, Vol II, No. 3. <http://mcel.pacificu.edu/jahc/jahcii3/articlesii3/wang/wang.html> Accessed 9.30/2001.
 
Weiser, Benjamin and Tim Golden. "Al Qaeda Is a Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in Waiting." The New York Times on the Web, 9/30/2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/international/30QAED.html > Accessed 9/30/2001.
 
Whine, Michael. "Islamist Organizations on the Internet. <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/islamnet.htm> Accessed 9/25/01
 
Young, Karen . ""Sleeper Cells" of Al Quaeda are next Target." Washington Post, December 3, 2001
<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/...> Accessed December 3, 2001.
 
 .08. RESOURCES (Return to Index)
 
The Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare <http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html> This is a metasite for links relating to all forms of electronic warfare. A number of the materials on the site seem to no longer be available, perhaps as a response to the events of 9-11. Accessed 10/30/2001
 

.09. Addendum of December 14, 2001.

The original of this essay was posted on December 13, 2001. The release of December 13, 2001 by the Pentagon of the transcript of a video tape secured by the Pentagon provides us more evidence on the nature of bin Laden's organization. (For the transcripts see < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf > See also The New York Times, December 143, 2001, "Text of Osama bin Laden Tape" < http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Bin-Laden-Tape-Text.html > Both sites accessed December 14, 2001.) There are a number of revelatory points in these transcripts. Interestingly, Al Quaeda as such is never mentioned. (Translators or the authors of the tape transcripts inserted a parenthetical explanation "meaning the al Qaida Egyptian group" as an explanation of Bin Laden's own reference to "...the Egyptian family..." as being led by Muhammad Atta, apparently the leader of the hijackers, but there is as yet no reason to believe that a specific reference to Al Quaeda occurs in the original tape. The parethetical reference amounts to an editorial comment in line with U.S. governmental statements and policy, not a specific translation of a portion of the tape). Other strong groups of supporters with foreknowledge were apparently in Saudi Arabian mosques. There are also references to groups in Holland and in the United States, though their direct involvement is not clear. All of these references indicate a decentralized web of the sort posited here. At the same time, it would seem that Bin Laden did have a strong leadership and planning function. We believe that this analysis is intact; Bin Laden is an important node in a web. We continue to believe that the web will function without him.

Jeffrey Barlow, Editor
December 13, 2001.
Addendum added December 14,2001.