The Digital Death of Jean Charles de Mendezes

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An Editorial Essay by Jeffrey Barlow <barlowj@pacificu.edu>
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Table of Contents:

Introduction

This editorial is an assessment of the shooting of Jean Charles de Mendezes on July 22, 2005 by London police in the belief that he was a suicide bomber. We write about it with some trepidation. The lives of many people were terribly altered and we have little first hand knowledge of the events.[1] However, we have been in related violent contexts, and draw upon those events below. To add our words to the millions already written and posted is perhaps arrogant, but also we feel, necessary, as the events teach us a great deal about surveillance societies and their digital tools.

Simply put, in the events two men, believing themselves to be acting out of stark necessity in defense of dozens of innocent bystanders, ended the life of a third. That man, Jean Charles de Mendezes, was innocent of any intent to act unlawfully, and the shooting was unnecessary. Hundreds of others---friends, families, colleagues of the shooters and their bosses, co-workers, British politicians and readers worldwide---have been drawn into the turmoil, which is still unfolding as we write

Our motives are not to condemn any of the participants, but to discuss the link between digital technology and the events. It also is an opportunity to better understand what is generally agreed to be the world's most conspicuous example of a digital surveillance society, London

Our research has convinced us that the shooting is a very complicated one. On the one hand, it is easy for us to imagine a situation in which we might well die like Mr. de Mendezes. We once, while doing research for our Ph.D. dissertation, lived and worked briefly in London, and daily took escalators down to the tube trains just as did Mr. de Mendezes moments before his death.

He died largely because of the way he looked, dressed, and acted. For our part, we were very much the angry anti-Vietnam war activist during our research in Europe, and could have been easily identified, like Jean Charles, as a suspicious character. The difference in our circumstances, we feel, is the development of the digital surveillance society and the events which drive the need for such surveillance during the almost fifty years that separated our descents toward the tube, I to my archives, and he to his death

Alternatively, my research makes it easy to understand that I might also, in good conscience if mistakenly, shoot to death someone like de Mendezes, given that a similar situation somehow transpired and I faced the same terrible choice to do so, believing this the only way to prevent the slaughter of dozens of innocent civilians whom I had sworn to protect.

The events unfolded in a chaotic context and Jean Charles had the dreadful luck to arrive at a fatal spot and at a fatal time. There he would meet his executioners, drawn there by a duty to protect innocent citizens, and, we believe, by the compounded errors and uncertainties of digital surveillance and communications.

London as a Surveillance Society: From Room 101 to Room 1600.

London is often referred to as "the CCTV (closed circuit television) capital of the world." We cannot find recent statistics of the total number of units deployed, probably because most such operations are privately operated by firms like banks, malls, and local administrations, and nobody really knows the total. The last semi-reliable estimate was four million cameras operating in 2004 for all of England.[2]

Anti-terrorist laws give the police access to all of these systems with a minimum of fuss, and those operated by public or governmental agencies are apparently constructed to standard specifications, making them both reliable, easy to download, and usable in legal proceedings. They are one key to understanding the death of Mr. De Mendezes

The development of the system began with a number of threats, some ancient, some emerging. The fear of Irish terrorists brought the government into the game, and then rising crime from 1997 to 2002 encouraged private industry and urban organizations to participate.[3] Following the initial rapid development of the system, some have begun to call into question not only its efficacy, but its efficiency as well.[4]

Not all Londoners, of course, support the creation of this system. One lovely satirical send-up of the system is reprinted here from Thomas Ricker's posting in Engadget, "Is the UK sleep-walking into a surveillance society? Duh."[5]

Posted Mar 22nd 2007 10:43AM by Thomas Ricker

This composite graphic reminds us of the multiple histories of British society. These include not only the "Troubles," but also a strong tradition of pastoralist romanticism and fierce resistance to the least hint of repression by public authority.

Further, for a writer who did eventually achieve that Ph.D., it is impossible to ignore literary predecessors to Room 1600, the Special Branch command and control center in the London headquarters of Scotland Yard. It was here that communications from the surveillance teams who were following Mr. Mendezes in the belief that he was a suspected terrorist bomber came in, and from there that the orders which resulted in his death went out.

Had Mr. de Mendezes survived, he might well have identified with Winston Smith, the protagonist of George Orwell's classic dystopian critique of totalitarian surveillance, 1984.[6] For the crime of an unlicensed love affair leading to "thoughtcrime," Winston was tortured in Room 101, where his worst nightmares came true via the magic of technology.

Mr. de Mendezes died in large part because Room 1600 at Scotland Yard was where, it was hoped, the dreams of an effective surveillance society could be achieve via the magic of digital technology. That technology was intended to identify a suspected terrorist suicide bomber, track, and either capture or kill him before he could strike. [7]

The pervasiveness of surveillance in London can be seen in Jean Charles' last hours. He left his apartment at "9.33 hours," in the language of the IIPC report used here.[8] Shortly after 10.02 hours, he was dead.

In those 30 minutes, he passed through the viewing fields of the following Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) apparatus:

  • As he walked to the bus station he was caught by surveillance CCTV cameras outside two different branches of the National Westminster Bank.
  • He boarded the #2 bus, which had 10 CCTV cameras on it.
  • At the Stockwell Underground station where the shooting occurred, he passed by 7 different CCTV cameras.

We will examine some of the implications and consequences of that technology below. For now, let us just point out that any citizen taking that same path would have had his or her image recorded repeatedly. Given that all the technology worked as planned, that image would have been saved on tape or hard-drive at least four times in 30 minutes

Most of these systems are not particularly sophisticated by contemporary standards, but are built to be cheap, reliable, and resistant to vandalism. Most are time-lapse in their operation, not intended to record a complete sequence but to catch wrong doers or possible criminals in at least several images. The great majority of these installations does not feed images in real time to observers, but create records to be examined later in case of need

It may help the reader to see actual images from this particular series of events. These can be downloaded at http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/page/0,,2203113,00.html (Fair warning: the images alone are sufficiently disturbing, knowing as we do the conclusion while viewing them, but they also eventually include shots of Jean Charles' corpse.)

The Terrorist Context

While the London CCTV system began to deal with Irish terrorists, its main target is now Islamist ones. The system proved to be very important following the events of July 7, 2005, when a series of terrorist bombs were exploded on three London subways and one bus. A total of 52 people died.[9] This created a situation in which all Londoners were at a high pitch of anxiety.

Once more, I call upon personal experience in an effort to better understand events and to empathize with all participants in them. I spent a month in Vietnam in 1968 on a tourist visa, both doing research on early 20th century Chinese revolutionaries, and frankly, "Seeing the Elephant"—war.

At that time, terror bombings were commonplace in Saigon, and the public transportation I sometimes utilized were sites of particular anxiety, because anybody could leave an explosive on a bus, or for that matter, toss one through the window. Even parked bicycles were a cause for concern.

122MM rockets, crude flying bombs, which were as much pointed as aimed or directed, were fired into the city at regular intervals. One of these passed directly over the building in which I was living, so closely as to leave burned fuel on the roof, and exploded in the next block, killing a young French priest who had heard it coming. Unlike my friends and I who were playing cards on the top floor and who mostly scuttled under the bed, he went to the window to see it explode literally right in front of him.

The emotions created by incidents like those that struck London and Saigon are not easily summarized. The intelligent reaction in Saigon, it seemed to me, was that of many Londoners—hyper caution with a determination to somehow proceed living life as though it might not end at any moment.

London authorities rolled out the full panoply of preventive and suppressive measures. Whereas 861 people had been stopped and questioned under the powers granted by the Terrorism Act 2000 in May, in July 4,750 were stopped. Nine thousand officer days of extra police forces were used. For the first time, the "Level of Threat" was raised to Level 1, meaning that an attack was expected imminently from "terrorists with an establish capability." In this same period, citizen reports of possible terrorists activity went from about one per week to about 1200 per week, for a total of more than 4500 in the three weeks immediately before de Mendezes' death on July 22.[10]

On July 21, additional terrorists attempted to detonate bombs apparently identical to those used in the first attacks, and again on the public transport system. These bombs were not correctly wired and failed to function. One of these terrorists, it is assumed, left a membership card for a gymnasium in one of the bags used to transport the bombs. This man was traced to an apartment block at 21 Scotia Road

This, then, was the context in the day immediately before the de Mendezes shooting. London had been savagely attacked less than a month before, and a group seemingly related to the same terrorist cell had just tried to do it again, but providentially failed. Two of the suspected terrorists were tied to the address at 21 Scotia Road, which was now assumed to be not only a terrorist hideout but also possibly a bomb-making factory. Jean Claude Mendezes lived at 17 Scotia Road, which may have shared an entrance with 21 Scotia Road, apparently a large building with many apartments.

The Policy Context: Operation Kratos

London Police had developed an elaborate plan for dealing with suspected terrorists, "Operation Kratos."[11] Kratos (Cratus in some spellings) was the Greek god of strength and war and the name of a video game.[12]

Operation Kratos, developed sometime after the New York 9/11 catastrophes as a British response to those events, was kept secret. However, it was intended in part to spell out policy responses in which it seemed that only pre-emptive and deadly force could prevent a suicide bombing. This policy, like all the policies and activities of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) discussed in our primary sources, the Stockwell reports, seems architectonic and bureaucratic to a fault. It must have appeared to the MPS that they had discussed every possible issue which might have arisen and built in redundant levels of safeguards against error or failure.

Kratos had never been deployed, but in the alarm following the July 7 bombings, critical agencies were updated on the policies, both via the circulation of documents and oral briefings. There were, in the next three weeks, 250 Kratos incidents, among them seven so serious that the order to shoot to kill might have been given, but was not.[13]

The essence of Operation Kratos, it appears, was that information would be collected and funneled up to specially trained and prepared police officers who alone could initiate a "Kratos shooting". For the heightened anti-terrorist operations following July 21, Room 1600 at Scotland Yard, headquarters of the Special Branch, was used.

During the attempt to place one of the malfunctioning bombs on July 21, the CCTV system recorded images of the two suspects registered at 21 Scotia Road. These were judged to be good likenesses when compared to the gym cards of the same two men.[14]

Failure to Communicate

Because of the high pitch of anxiety following the successful attacks of July 7 and the unsuccessful ones of the 21st, a variety of police forces, including some specially briefed for Kratos operations were mobilized and on the early morning of the 22nd, deployed at Scotia Road.

The surveillance team was authorized in Room 1600 at 4:38 a.m. A Special Operations team arrived at 6:04 and began surveillance. Now a series of technical and human failures began the deadly sequence that would end in a useless death.

It must be noted that everybody assumed that communications were not an issue. The surveillance and firearms teams all had Cougar radios, and some Met radios and mobile phones.[15] This is important because it shows that despite the complexities of a Kratos operation, all involved felt a successful one to be well within their capability. Yet in the end, success and failure depended upon rapid and unambiguous information being collected and passed between multiple actors.

At the scene at Scotia Road, the officer "Frank" had a video camera with which to image the suspects if they emerged. However, he had unknowingly loaded a used tape, complicating later examination of the record, chose to rely upon uncertain batteries when he had the opportunity to plug into the electrical system of the van in which he was concealed, and had to link to relay the images back to Room 1600. Between 7:26 and 11:02 he managed to video six of eight people who exited the building.

Among the two he missed, unfortunately, was de Menezes when he emerged at 9:02, Frank was relieving himself into a plastic container and missed getting a video shot. He grabbed for the camera and tried to record, but did not have hands-free communications and opted rather to radio colleagues that "it would be worth somebody else having a look."[16]

The next surveillance officer posted in the direction de Menezes took was "Tim" who described him as having collar length black hair, stubble, a wide face and coloring similar to a "light skinned North African." Had Frank gotten video and relayed it to headquarters the incident might have ended at that point with a careful comparison of the tapes of the previous day's failed bombings. Osman, the actual bomber with whom de Menezes was now confused, had a beard, tightly coiled black hair, and a decidedly long as opposed to broad face, and was in fact, much darker than de Menezes. James, however, examining a photograph produced from the earlier surveillance tape, said that de Menezes was "possibly identical" to the bomber.

Photo from BBC News, 23 July 2005.[17] Jean Claude de Menezes is in foreground on far right of the group above.

Hussain Osman, captured on a bus CCTV after his bomb failed on the Tube. He was the man whom the police consistently tried to identify as de Mendezes. However, we do not know if this is the photo used in the operation.

Other agents, "Tim" and "Harry" now began to observe Jean Claude, who was now said to be looking over his shoulder and acting wary. (This probably put him into the same class as most Londoners at that tense time, let alone those who had just been scrutinized and discussed within fifteen minutes by at least four men.) Harry "was not able" to identify the subject as Osman, the suspected bomber. [18]

Yet another officer, Ken, tried to get into position to view de Menezes, but his radio malfunctioned and he could neither transmit nor hear the discussion of the others. De Menezes boarded a bus. Another agent, "Ivor", boarded the bus at a later stop. He sat behind the suspect but could not positively identify him as Osman, but now added that the suspect had distinctive "Mongolian eyes."

Harry passed this information to the rest of the team, given that their radios were now all functioning. For some of the teams, communications were described as "intermittent."[19] Among the men receiving intermittent communications was "Charlie 12" the first man to ultimately shoot de Menezes.

Also having radio problems was "Trojan 80," the tactical advisor to the commander in Room 1600. Given his knowledge of Kratos planning and his personal experience, which was considerable, he was intended to be a key link in authorizing a Kratos shooting. He was at Scotland Yard, at least in and out of Room 1600 if not always present. He had an open mobile line to another critical officer, "Trojan 84," and a Cougar radio which was intermittent.

"Trojan 80" was in the field, trying to coordinate the information coming in from the agents, using the mobile line to Trojan 84, an intermittent Cougar radio with other field teams, and, in addition an open channel to the firearms teams, probably on a Met radio in a vehicle.

The confusion was such that the officer logging communications to Trojan 80 entered into his log at 20:43 a note that "the male is "not ident (identical? Identified?) and the surveillance team will withdraw to their original position."[20] We understand this to mean that the team was ordered withdrawn and de Menezes judged by somebody not to be the suspect. But events ground forward, and the log entry was never to be explained.

"Graham" reported that the suspect was using a cell phone. (De Menezes was calling a friend to tell him he might be late at work.) "Laurence" met up with James and Ken and said that he did not believe de Menezes was the suspect. "Hotel 11," another agent reported in that he believed the suspect was Osman. The Room 1600 team would later say that at this time they believed the suspect to be acting "nervous and twitchy." "Pat" told Room 1600—where officers were shouting back and forth in an effort to communicate in the room that 'It is him, the man off the bus. They think it is him and he is very very jumpy."

Other specialized teams now heard that a positive identification had been made and began converging on de Mendezes' location. The atmosphere was such that a circumstantial argument against Mr. de Mendezes had begun to build. He was wearing a light jacket of the sort Americans would call a "windbreaker" probably quite comfortable on an early morning in London, even in July. In additional conversations, this became a heavy denim jacket that might be intended to hide a bomb. Now he was not only dark, but looked "Oriental."[21] He went from "wary" to "twitchy" to "very very jumpy.

As Jean Charles' last journey continued, the highly qualified judgments made by men in the field, including one who said that Jean Charles was "probably not" the suspect, and many who had declined to identify him, were aggregated into one, more certain voice. He was now "probably" the terrorist observed the previous evening. Room 1600 now believed that a positive identification had been made and that a bomber was moving toward the tube system.

Room 1600 had not been built to be a digital war room as such, but was taken over at the last minute for the Kratos Operation. It was noisy, various voices were shouting at each other, and in this cacophony the officer in charge told special teams following Jean Charles, now including an armed response team of specially alerted units, not to let him enter the tube station. He did so. The films from CCTV video at the station are useful here. http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/page/0,,2203113,00.html Again, we remind the reader of their graphic conclusion.

It is easy to summarize the events discussed above in perhaps only one area: it can clearly be said that they constitute a massive failure of communications, some technical in origin, some human. The IPCC investigation of the shooting was to list among its 'central issues' "The Structure and Management of Communications." [22]

Tragedy

The police, the final report said, had now made a number of serious errors. The entire reason for the Kratos plan was to prevent bombs from being detonated in crowded public places. Jean Charles could have been interviewed, taken down, immobilized at several points; but now he was in the tube.

But the commander at 1600, as well as Trojan 80 and 84 were all totally out of touch with the teams descending into the tube: the police radio system did not work underground, as had been reported and cautioned against much earlier. This was to be the final failure in the communications system that led to the shooting. The commander in 1600 understood that she had ordered simply that the suspect be stopped. The several teams below ground believed that a Kratos shooting had been ordered.

From this point, events are confusing and somewhat controversial.[23] Police reports stress their repeated and loud self-identifications, their certainty of a potentially serious terror bombing similar to those of July 7, and Jean Charles' failure to comply. However, not one witness interviewed—the car, while not filled, had more than 20 people on it, many sitting in Jean Charles' vicinity—agreed that the police had, in fact, identified themselves.

One witness thought that the police were terrorists, Ivor. The policeman mentioned above who was also said to look Asian, was grabbed by still other police.

Jean Charles got to his feet, intending, the report speculates, to evacuate the car, as the occupants soon came to understand they were to do. While one policeman wrapped him up and pushed him back into his seat, Charlie 12 fired repeatedly into his head, followed by still other officers, for a total of seven shots.

Aftermath

After much hubbub, including apparent attempts by the police and associated political hierarchy to avoid an additional investigation, charges were brought by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, an arm of the Crown, for breaking health and safety laws while killing de Mendezes.[24] The IPCC report condemned the police in several regards, not only for the killing, but also for procedural failures which might have resulted in catastrophe, had Jean Charles been, in fact, a suicide bomber.

In the subsequent trial, digital technology continued to be central. The police introduced a series of digital exhibits in an effort to bring the surveillance system and its digital records to their support.

We recognize here that the origins of key digital materials are uncertain and restrict the degree of certainty with which we can write of these events. We are interested in one question: how much did Hussain Osman, the conspirator with whom de Mendezes was confused, in fact resemble de Menezes? Was a misidentification a tragic but fully understandable error or was it a series of errors, many of which could have been prevented? Was it human failure, or was it a "Kratos error," a failure of the highest level to which London's surveillance society has attempted to rise? All photos we have seen suggest some resemblance in age and approximate height, but a resemblance certainly far less than the certainty required to legitimate a killing.

Neither can we say that the materials we have seen are inclusive. We are not sure that we have a reproduction of the photo circulated among the surveillance team, and neither are we certain of that photo's origins. It may be from a single frame of a surveillance tape; it may have been a good copy of the identification card used at the gymnasium to which Osman had been traced

The only evidence we have states that Osman fled the station after setting the defective bomb. He then boarded a bus and was captured on CCTV, which was, the BBC stated, to be a crucial breakthrough in identifying him.[25] We assume that the CCTV photo shown above was, therefore, critical to the misidentification.

At the trials concluded in October 2007, the police produced a composite photograph of Jean Charles de Menezes and of the chief suspect for whom he was mistaken, Hussain Osman. The police intent was to show how easy it was to confuse the two. These appear to be the photos from which the composite was created.

On the left, Jean Charles de Mendezes; on the right, Hussain Osman.[26]

However, all evidence suggests that Osman's photo above may not have been the one from which the misidentification proceeded, but that it was perhaps from one of the surveillance camera shots shown above, or possibly, from a gym card found in one of the defective bomb bags.

Police composite photo.

The photo below is a prosecution exhibit, marked up to show areas where, forensics consultant Michael George argued, the photos had been "photoshopped" to digitally increase the likeness between the two photos.[27]

Mr. George made two serious charges that further illuminate the part that digital materials played in this event:

First, he said, " ...the police composite appeared to have a "greater definition" than the two images used to produce it."[28] This amounts, we assume, to a statement that a "sharpen" command had been applied to the composite. Such a process extrapolates from digital material that is present to add missing detail. This is particularly critical when we think of how many times in these events the police had relied upon surveillance tapes of suspects.

The fact that we lack copies of the initial print made from the surveillance video of the perpetrators of the failed bombings used by the police to misidentify Mr. de Mendezes now becomes critical. We are left only to wonder if it, too, had been given "greater definition." Neither can we be entirely sure that the photo circulated among the surveillance teams was that from the tape as opposed to that from the gym card found in the bag with the unexploded bomb.

Secondly, Mr. George said, "..making the image brighter has changed the image." Here the charge is that the two images were brought into the same register of overall brightness and contrast, which subjectively will increase the likelihood that any viewer will accept the two subjects of the composite photos to be two highly similar individuals.

It would also be easy to be critical of racial profiling. The police explanation for their initial interest in Mr. de Mendezes was that he was dark, looked "Oriental," was wearing suspicious clothing, and seemed agitated. Of course, given the type of person the police were looking for, this would have been true of any suspect. And if the photo taken from the tape had been doctored to increase definition anything might have happened. The final product may have made the suspect look more or less like other individuals.

In an attempt to show the problems of developing identification photos from surveillance tapes we reproduce below the digital records secured by police from CCTV installations in the tube stations where bombs were planted.[29]

Co-conspirator Ramzi Mohammed in CCTV tape, fleeing scene of attempted bombing.[30]

Ramzi Mohammed is confronted on the Tube after his bomb fails to explode

Yassin Omar, following his failed detonation

Osman and the three others were convicted in July 2007, of the failed bombing conspiracy.

Conclusion: The Failure of Digital Surveillance

We believe that meaningless death of an innocent individual, and the possible destruction of the careers of several police and political officials, is not ultimately the result of individual bad decisions. We think it was caused by a decision to rely on technology, computers, video cameras, cell phones, communicators, all the elements of the London surveillance system, to solve human problems.

Many might argue, however, that more and better technology, properly employed, might have prevented the tragedy. Such failures as that the police relied upon a bad graphic, did not send back to room 1600 actual videos of Jean Claude to be compared under ideal conditions with the images of the suspected terrorists, that the police could not communicate effectively among themselves leading to a false strong positive being erroneously communicated to room 1600, and that the police descending into the tube were given ambiguous orders, and that they then were out of communications with other units—that these were all preventable problems.

Upon first reading of Room 1600, my initial mental image was of a highly digitized war room, staffed by calm well-trained technicians connected by instant communication with thoughtful seasoned police veterans protecting the British public.

Ultimately, of course, this is an image derived from many popular films. These are the sorts of images that make the surveillance society appealing. It has worked for any number of movie heroes, why shouldn't it work for us?

The reality was, of course, a commandeered room with excited individuals shouting at each other, in poor communications with even each other, let alone with the field personnel. And the field operations were close to pure chaos, themselves akin to other, older film images of the Keystone Cops.

However, this editorial is emphatically not a plea for better technology. It is an argument that technology can only go so far in solving our problems, and that the surveillance society, however well established, will inevitably produce senseless tragedies.

No matter how sophisticated our digital servants become, at some point a fallible human being, or worse, a mob of highly excited fallible human being will have to make a critical decision: To shoot, or not to shoot.

We believe that the de Mendezes shooting properly should be the high-water mark of digital surveillance societies. But the aftermath of the London shooting strongly suggests that this will not be the case. The distribution of blame among individuals leaves the true cause, the over-reliance upon digital devices, their processes and products, free to go.

Endnotes

[1] We are, as well, operating from a limited database. Our primary source of information has been the Nov. 7, 2007 release of the "Stockwell One" report of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) For the pages of the IPCC and a source for downloadable reports bearing on the events, see: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/ Our other sources of information have been a series of reports and articles in the English paper, The Guardian, on line edition, and in the on-line editions of the BBC world news. The Guardian is regarded both as one of the few truly international on-line newspapers, and as a left-leaning one. For The Guardian, go to: http://www.guardian.co.uk The de Mendezes reports, continually updated, can be accessed from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/menezes/0,,1691452,00.html

[2] See Button, James, "How London Became the world's CCTV Capital" Theage.com.au at: http://www.theage.com.au/news/war-on-terror/how-london-became-the-world146s-cctv-capital/2005/07/25/1122143780626.html#

[3] The best single source we have seen on this development is Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, "CCTV in London," Working Paper No.6. www.Urbaneye.net. The report can be downloaded at: http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf
The authors were then at the Center for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Hull.

[4] See BBC News, 22 March 2007, "MPs probe 'surveillance society'" An inquiry into the growing use of surveillance in society is to be held by an influential committee of MPs. Found at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6479395.stm
See also "CCTV overload in London not as effective as previously hoped?" Posted Sep 22nd 2007 12:58AM by Darren Murph, a blog posting with references to local perspectives, at http://www.engadget.com/2007/09/22/cctv-overload-in-london-not-as-effective-as-previously-hoped/

[5] Posted Mar 22nd 2007 10:43AM by Thomas Ricker http://www.engadget.com/2007/03/22/is-the-uk-sleep-walking-into-a-surveillance-society-duh/

[6] Naturally all of our readers are familiar with this novel, but if some, like myself, needed a refresher, they could also go to: http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/1984/

[7] Obviously, those who worked there would see this comparison between Room 101 and Room 600 as dreadfully inappropriate. Mr. De Mendezes' opinion on the comparison, like everything else about his life after July 22, 2005, will go unrecorded.

[8] IPCC Stockwell One, 126

[9] IPCC Stockwell One, 16.

[10] IPCC, Stockwell One, p. 17.

[11] IPCC, Stockwell One, section 9, pp 40-45.

[12] See http://www.google.com/search?q=KRATOS&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

[13] See Wikipedia, "Operation kratos" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Kratos#History_of_Operation_Kratos accessed November 25, 2007. The information in this entry seems reliable, based on my own close readings of related documents. In addition the Wikipedia site is regularly updated and has material drawn from recently breaking news.

[14] It should be noted that it was known that the suicide bombers in the earlier attacks had also used gymnasiums as sites for their activities—possibly to explain public meetings?

[15] IPCC p. 100.

[16] IPCC p. 55.

[17] Found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4711021.stm

[18] Events here from IPCC pp 55-59.

[19] IPCC, p 93.

[20] IPCC, p 127.

[21] "Oriental," to Americans, invariably means "Asian" but historically in British English, the Orient was "East of Suez" and included many Arabic states and peoples as well.

[22] IPCC p. 119.

[23] Many witness accounts differ radically from police accounts, and the IPPC investigation into the shooting found also that a key police log had been altered, after the police reports had been entered following the shooting. There are apparently severe disagreements within the political and police establishment as to initial events and to police reactions following them. See April 19, 2006

"The shooting of de Mendezes: inquiry witness on a collision course" from the Guardian, http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2006/04/the_shooting_of.html

[24] I assume this to be a British equivalent to the American practice of accusing presumed criminals of violating the victim's civil rights when all other recourse seems to have failed, particularly when cases have a high public profile.

[25] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm

[26] Summers, Chris, "Why Menezes was true victim of 21/7," BBC NEWS 10 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm

[27] See Mendezes picture 'was manipulated' BBC NEWS 17 October, 2007, found at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048756.stm

[28] "Profile Hussain Osman, BBC NEWS, 9 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048756.stm

[29] Taken from "In pictures: 21 July investigation" BBC NEWS 9 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/6237594.stm

[30] Profile: Ramzi Mohammed BBC NEWS, 9 July 2007.